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Abstract
Humans are highly attuned to perceptual cues about their values. A growing body of evidence suggests that people
selectively attend to moral stimuli. However, it is unknown whether morality is prioritized early in perception or much later
in cognitive processing. We use a combination of behavioral methods and electroencephalography to investigate how early
in perception moral words are prioritized relative to non-moral words. The behavioral data replicate previous research
indicating that people are more likely to correctly identify moral than non-moral words in a modified lexical decision task.
The electroencephalography data reveal that words are distinguished from non-words as early as 200 ms after onset over
frontal brain areas and moral words are distinguished from non-moral words 100 ms later over left-posterior cortex. Further
analyses reveal that differences in brain activity to moral vs non-moral words cannot be explained by differences in arousal
associated with the words. These results suggest that moral content might be prioritized in conscious awareness after an
initial perceptual encoding but before subsequent memory processing or action preparation. This work offers a more precise
theoretical framework for understanding how morality impacts vision and behavior.
Key words: morality; EEG; social neuroscience; conscious awareness; vision

Introduction
Morality is such an integral part of social life that we must be
vigilant for cues about the moral values in our group. Yet, most
models of moral psychology are based on tasks in which people
read (and must understand) moral dilemmas (e.g. Kohlberg, 1979;
Haidt, 2001; Greene and Haidt, 2002; Paxton and Greene, 2010;
for a recent review Everett and Kahane, 2020). This approach
has been proven fruitful, but it overlooks an important precursor

to moral judgment and decision-making: how do people see
a moral stimulus in the first place? To better understand the
precursors to moral judgment, a small but growing body of
research has begun to examine how morality shapes vision and,
in turn, is shaped by vision (Gantman and Van Bavel, 2014, 2015a,
2016). The current research uses a combination of behavioral
and neuroscientific methods to investigate exactly when in
the perceptual processing stream moral information is treated
differently than other information.
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Morality plays a central role in the life of social groups (Haidt,
2008). To signal their alignment with their group (Haidt and
Graham, 2009) and avoid violating group values that may bar
them from access to key social and psychological resources, individuals need to remain vigilant for morally relevant information
in the environment. Indeed, evidence suggests that people have
heightened awareness of moral stimuli (Gantman and Van Bavel,
2015a)—especially when moral goals are active (Gantman and
Van Bavel, 2016). Moreover, people show enhanced perception
for the faces of people who have committed morally bad actions
(Anderson et al., 2011) as well as visual depictions of bad outcomes befalling morally bad actors (Callan et al., 2013). Because
the ability to recognize moral situations and act appropriately
is critical to one’s status in social groups, people may be highly
attuned to the presence of moral stimuli.
Taken together, this recent work (e.g. Gantman and Van Bavel,
2015a) suggests that morality may shape numerous aspects
of perception—from visual attention to conscious awareness.
However, the link between morality and visual experience is
still underspecified. The studies to date largely focus on explicit
behavioral responses to moral stimuli in order to make inferences about the underlying processes. For example, in one set
of tasks, participants were presented with backward masked
moral, non-moral words and scrambled non-words in a lexical
decision task (Gantman and Van Bavel, 2014). When asked to
judge whether a given stimulus (presented at the threshold
for conscious awareness) was a word or not, participants correctly identified moral words with a higher degree of accuracy
than non-moral words. This phenomenon—whereby perceivers
demonstrate a heightened awareness of morally laden content—
has been termed the moral pop-out effect.
The time course of moral perception remains uncertain, however. In the case of the moral pop-out effect, for example, it is
unclear how early in processing moral words are differentiated
from non-moral words (e.g. in perception vs memory; Firestone
and Scholl, 2015a, 2016; Gantman and Van Bavel, 2015b, 2015C).
For instance, some work has argued that visual perception is
impenetrable to the influence of morality (Firestone and Scholl,
2015a)—part of a longstanding debate in cognitive science about
cognitive penetrability (Firestone and Scholl, 2016). Therefore,
more work is needed to understand exactly when in perceptual
processing moral content is prioritized. We aimed to clarify
this process by using a measure with precise temporal resolution. This will allow us to develop a more refined theoretical
understanding of the relationship between vision and morality.
As such, the current research examines how early morality
is prioritized. We used electroencephalography (EEG) because
this method offers highly precise temporal resolution—at the
order of milliseconds—to interrogate the timing of moral information processing (Luck, 2005; Luck and Kappenman, 2011). For
instance, several studies using event-related potentials (ERPs)
have found that social categories can influence perceptual processing very quickly (Ito and Cacioppo, 2000; Smith et al., 2003;
Ito et al., 2004). In this way, ERPs can be thought of as an additional reaction time measure of the mental computations that
unfold between the stimulus and response. As such, temporal
distinctions between deflections in the ERP signal are meaningful and may reflect different stages of perceptual and cognitive processing. The amplitude of these deflections can be
used to estimate the amount of or ease of processing at each
stage of processing. In this way, the study of ERPs provides
a lens into the implicit perceptual and cognitive processing
that is occurring online while people are completing a task
(Cunningham et al., 2009).

Indeed, recent work has used ERP analyses to examine the
temporal dynamics underlying moral judgment and evaluation.
In such studies, participants were recorded while processing
morality-related words (e.g. Yang et al., 2017), behaviors (e.g. Yang
et al., 2014), and images (e.g. Decety and Cacioppo, 2012), often in
direct comparison to core disgust-related stimuli (e.g. Yang et al.,
2014, 2017). Taken together, the extant ERP literature on morality is somewhat mixed: across this work, various researchers
have observed morality-related changes in amplitudes in the
N1 (Yoder and Decety, 2014; Gui et al., 2016), N180 (successful
vs attempted harm/help; Gan et al., 2016), recognition potential
(vs neutral words; Yang et al., 2017), P200 (shame vs guilt; Zhu
et al., 2019), P300 (vs neutral behaviors; Yang et al., 2014), N400
(vs neutral words; Luo et al., 2013) and late positive potential
(LPP; Gui et al., 2016; Leuthold et al., 2015). Moreover, this work
indicates that various ERP components related to morality are
sensitive to both valence and arousal (e.g. valence: N1 & N2,
Yoder and Decety, 2014; LPP, Leuthold et al., 2015; arousal: N2,
Gui et al., 2016; P200, Sarlo et al., 2012; LPP, Yoder and Decety,
2014; Gui et al., 2016). The current paper builds on this prior
work by comparing moral to non-moral information processing
to better understand the time course of brain activity between
stimulus and response that leads to a response advantage for
moral words. Given the relative heterogeneity of this previous
work, the present work will serve to add clarity to the existing
ERP literature on morality.
We reasoned that using an implicit measure of information
processing is critical to this particular issue since behavioral
responses can be easily contaminated with attention, memory
and motor responses. This makes it very difficult to draw any
firm conclusions about the underlying perceptual processing
facilitating the moral pop-out effect. Using EEG allows us to
determine when moral and non-moral stimuli are differentiated
in the brain—even if this process is happening outside conscious
awareness or before people can register a behavioral response
to a stimulus. This approach also reduces any concerns about
demand effects since people are unable to generate specific
patterns of brain activity in the same way they might be able to
perform a specific pattern of behavior. We see three plausible
alternatives for when moral content influences brain activity.
We present them here in chronological order for clarity.

Hypothesis 1: morality affects early visual
representations
There are multiple possible times at which moral information
might begin to alter stimulus processing. One extreme possibility
is that the presence of morally relevant stimuli could affect
very early visual representations of the stimuli—possibly in the
first few hundred milliseconds of visual processing, when the
bottom-up information is transmitted to the ventral visual pathway to identify the stimulus. Another possible pathway through
which moral relevance could affect early visual presentations
would be if morally relevant stimuli bypass visual cortex and
transmit directly to subcortical structures like the amygdala
(Tamietto and De Gelder, 2010; Garrido et al., 2012). For instance,
there is some evidence that early sensory ERP components like
the P1, N1, P2 and N2 can be influenced by both top-down factors,
like the direction of spatial attention (Zhang and Luck, 2008) and
cognitive control (for a review, Folstein and Van Petten, 2008), as
well as bottom-up factors, like stimulus salience (e.g. Strayer and
Johnston, 2000). Indeed, the rapid aspects of social perception
can be shaped by motivational states (Cunningham et al., 2012),
including morally relevant information (Yoder and Decety, 2014;
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Gui et al., 2016). Thus, it seems possible that differences in the
prioritization of moral words may occur during this very early
perceptual stage, which can be influenced by higher-order states.
It might also be possible to find evidence for morality affecting early visual representations if we saw a difference in brain
activity for moral (vs non-moral) stimuli emerge prior to differences between words and non-words. This is theoretically
possible, though slightly difficult to make sense of in the domain
of words; the moral relevance of the word would have to come
through before evidence of recognizing the letter string as a
word. This may be more plausible in a different domain (e.g.
ambiguous objects) where the moral relevance might be ascertainable prior to precise object recognition (e.g. a burnt piece
of toast could be evaluated as morally relevant before people
consciously discern an image of Mother Teresa or Jesus). Instead,
to find evidence of moral relevance affecting brain activity in
the earliest response window, we reasoned that early processing
of words (vs non-words) could happen concurrently with moral
(vs non-moral) processing. Word vs non-word processing must
unfold over the next few milliseconds after stimulus onset, and
we could see differences in brain activity to moral (vs non-moral)
stimuli occurring in this same window (i.e. at the same time as
the word vs non-word processing).

Hypothesis 2: morality affects what reaches perceptual
awareness
A second possibility is that moral stimuli are prioritized after initial perceptual encoding but before memory or response preparation, enhancing perceptual awareness of these stimuli. The
P3 is thought to represent a post-perceptual cognitive process
associated with the transition from perception into response
preparation elicited by task relevant and motivationally significant stimuli that emerges as early as 250 after stimulus onset
(Squires et al., 1977; Polich, 2012). For instance, the P3 is larger
for motivationally significant stimuli (e.g. Johnston et al., 1986),
including one’s own name (i.e. the ‘cocktail party effect’; Gray
et al., 2004). According to one popular account, the P3 has been
proposed to represent a physiological ignition event associated
with widespread neurotransmitter release and communication
of the perceptual information to support response preparation
and conscious awareness (Dehaene et al., 2006). If so, this would
occur after the initial few hundred milliseconds of visual processing—shortly after the brain distinguishes the nature of the
stimuli (e.g. word vs non-word), but before subsequent cognitive and motor processing represented by the LPP. However,
enhanced awareness of moral stimuli would likely be followed
by downstream effects during response preparation. In other
words, morally relevant stimuli could produce a kind of cocktail
party effect; instead of suddenly hearing one’s own name ‘pop
out’ among the party noise, one might hear a morally relevant
word or phrase.

Hypothesis 3: morality only affects cognitive processing
A third possibility is that moral content influences brain activity during much later, cognitive processing. According to this
account, differences between moral and non-moral stimuli may
reflect differences in cognition (e.g. memory retrieval) or in
preparing a response to the stimulus (e.g. motor facilitation).
For instance, the late positive waveform starts 400 or more
milliseconds after stimulus presentation and is a long-lasting
wave form that often persists for 500 ms (Friedman and Johnson,
2000). This wave form reflects substantial cognitive processing
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associated with response preparation, which is sustained long
after the initial presentation of a stimulus. When individuals
dedicate increased mental resources to processing a stimulus
and preparing a response, an increase in this late positive waveform is observed (Gilden et al., 1966; Schupp et al., 2000), including
in the context of moral judgment (Leuthold et al., 2015; Gui
et al., 2016). If we do not observe a difference between moral
and non-moral stimuli until this later time window, it would
provide evidence suggesting that the response advantage for
morally relevant stimuli reflects additional cognitive processing
following initial perception.

Overview of current research
In the current research, we measured ERPs evoked by moral
and non-moral words to measure how early in the visual processing stream moral words bias brain activity. When the brain
distinguishes between moral and non-moral, classes of stimuli
will provide adjudicating evidence between these three different
explanations: early in perception, intermediary at the gateway
to consciousness in the P3 time window or late in response
preparation in the late positive window.
Previous research demonstrates that people are more likely
to correctly identify rapidly presented moral words compared
to matched non-moral words (Gantman and Van Bavel, 2014,
2015b), but only when the words were presented near the threshold for perceptual awareness—a phenomenon known as the
moral pop-out effect. Using the same approach, we presented
moral and non-moral words very rapidly in a lexical decision
task. The current research sought to determine when in the
visual processing stream moral words are differentiated from
non-moral words. This gave us the opportunity to pursue three
research goals at once. First, we replicated the moral pop-out
effect behaviorally and examined precisely when moral words
were prioritized in the perceptual processing stream; second, we
used this method to examine if moral relevance affects visual
experience at the level of perception, awareness or only later in
memory (for debate see Firestone and Scholl, 2015b; Gantman
and Van Bavel, 2015a, 2015c). Third, we have contributed to
the growing literature investigating morality related-changes
in brain activity (as measured by ERPs; Luck, 2005; Luck and
Kappenman, 2011; Decety and Cacioppo, 2012; Luo et al., 2013;
Yang et al., 2014, 2017; Yoder and Decety, 2014; Leuthold et al.,
2015; Gan et al., 2016; Gui et al., 2016; Zhu et al., 2019).
If the moral pop-out effect is entirely dependent on low-level
visual perception via very early processing, then it would be
predicted that moral words would differ in the first 100 ms of
visual processing, as the bottom-up information is transmitted
to the ventral visual pathway to identify the word (Luck and
Kappenman, 2011). If we do not see differences until well after
400 ms, then the moral pop-out effect would be better understood as a cognitive or response preparation effect, rather than
a perceptual phenomenon per se (Luck and Kappenman, 2011).
However, if the differences in processing emerge between these
very early and late waveforms, this would suggest that moral
words may receive a preferential gate into conscious awareness,
perhaps due to their motivational relevance (Kouider et al., 2013;
Gantman and Van Bavel, 2016).

Methods
Participants
A total of 54 paid volunteers (mean age = 23.26; 36 female, 1
non-binary) from the University of Alberta community gave
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Fig. 1. Schematic of lexical decision task. Participants saw a fixation cross for a variable period, followed by either a moral word, non-moral word or scrambled non-word
displayed for 16.6 ms. After a 50 ms SOA, a backward mask was presented for 25 ms. The screen remained blank for 1500 ms during which participants indicated with
a ‘1’ or ‘5’ whether the string of letters appeared as a word or a non-word, respectively. Stimuli are not shown to scale. Scalp topography shows the layout of the 15
scalp electrodes, the ground at AFz and 2 references on the mastoids. Darker circles indicate the electrodes from which data are presented.

informed consent, as approved by the internal Research Ethics
Board. We used the same sample size from previous work on
the moral pop-out effect, as the task participants completed was
almost identical (Gantman and Van Bavel, 2014). The experimental design was fully within subjects to optimize statistical power.
All participants reported normal or corrected vision and English
as their first language. There were no other exclusionary factors.
They were compensated with a $10 honorarium for their participation. Of the initial 54 participants, four individual results
were removed from the data before analysis because one did
not respond on the majority (74%) of trials, one had a corrupted
data file and two highly favored the non-word response (100
and 93%). [As the overall distribution of trials was 50% word and
50% non-word, and presentation was manipulated to achieve
perceptual ambiguity (75% overall accuracy; see below), this nondifferentiation might indicate that these latter participants simply did not adequately see the presented stimuli or simply were
not compliant with the task instructions.] This left a final sample
of 50 participants for our within-subjects experiment. We report
how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions, all
manipulations and all measures in the study.

Materials and procedure
A slightly modified version of the lexical decision task from
Gantman and Van Bavel (2014) was employed. Participants sat
in a dark room, 57 cm from a 1920 × 1090 pixel2 (22.5 diagonal)
ViewPixx/EEG LCD monitor (VPixx Technologies) with a refresh
rate of 120 Hz. Stimuli were presented on a 50% gray background
with a Windows 7 PC running Matlab R2012b with the Psychophysics toolbox (Version 3.0.14; Brainard, 1997). Video output
was sent to the ViewPixx/EEG with an Asus Striker GTX760
graphics processing unit. The experimental task script, all analysis scripts and all data files are available upon publication or during review at the Open Science Foundation (https://osf.io/5jmze/)
and Github (https://github.com/kylemath/MoralWordEEG).
On each trial, participants were instructed to fixate on a
central cross, attend to the lexical stimulus being presented
and determine whether they had been presented with a word

or a non-word (Figure 1). The black central fixation cross was
present for a variable pre-trial fixation period between 400 and
700 ms; then the target letter string was presented at fixation
for 16.66 ms. The letter strings were presented in 8% gray in font
size 20 against a 50% gray background. The target was followed
by the fixation cross for a fixed 33.33 ms period, giving a stimulus
onset asynchrony (SOA) of 50 ms between the target and the
backward mask (a string of ampersands as long as the preceding
target word), which was presented for 25 ms. The masks were
presented in 30% gray in font size 20 against the same 50% gray
background. Font size, background color and stimulus duration
were determined through piloting to ensure that stimuli would
be perceptually ambiguous, such that overall accuracy was near
75%, (50% would represent completely random responding, and
100% would represent complete accuracy). Previous work on the
moral pop-out effect has shown that differences in moral and
non-moral word detection occur only when words are presented
ambiguously (Gantman and Van Bavel, 2014, 2015b). As such, we
decided a priori to present stimuli that would be perceptually
ambiguous (i.e. correctly identified 75% of the time), which we
accomplished by manipulating font size, background color and
stimulus duration.
Participants were instructed to attempt to discriminate
whether a word or a non-word was presented. Following mask
offset, participants responded to the target by pressing the ‘1’ key
(to indicate seeing a word) with their left index finger or by pressing the ‘5’ key (to indicate seeing a non-word) with their right
index finger. In the event that they were unsure of the target,
participants were instructed to guess. The next pre-trial fixation
period began after a fixed response period of 1500 ms after mask
offset, regardless of whether the participant responded.1
Participants completed 10 blocks of 50 trials. Trial order was
pseudo-randomized. Our stimuli comprised 125 moral words

1

In previous research, the next trial would not advance until a response
was made. When trials are removed in which participants made no
response, the moral pop-out effect is unchanged, B = 0.17, SE = 0.05, 95%
CI [0.08, 0.26], P < 0.005, z = 3.60.
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(e.g. kill, should), 125 non-moral words (e.g. die, could) and 250
non-words. Words were taken from the initial moral-word popout study (Gantman and Van Bavel, 2014) and a slightly modified replication (Firestone and Scholl, 2015a). Non-words were
scrambled versions of the moral and non-moral words to keep
overall letter content between words and non-words constant.
Words were length- and frequency-matched with the Corpus of
Contemporary American English (COCA; Davies, 2008). A metaanalysis of previous studies found that the moral pop-out effect
remained significant even after adjusting for any differences
in valence and extremity and reported arousal between moral
and non-moral words (Gantman and Van Bavel, 2014). Further
analyses regarding valence and arousal are also included in this
paper. We note that while the present sample of participants did
not provide their own ratings of the moral relevance of the words
in our stimulus set, subjective ratings acquired across multiple
sets of previous participants established the construct validity
of this manipulation (Firestone and Scholl, 2015a; Gantman and
Van Bavel, 2014).
Prior to the experiment participants performed a practice
block with 50 words and 50 non-words, all non-moral and
different from those used in the main study. Practice words
were presented at high contrast (black) in order to familiarize
the participants with the word types (e.g. words vs non-words)
with full awareness of them, but all other materials and timing
were identical.
Following the experiment, participants were sent an electronic questionnaire that assessed their belief in a just world
(Lerner and Miller, 1978), moral identity (Aquino and Reed, 2002),
political ideology and trust in the justice system (devised by
the authors). However, as not all participants completed this
survey, these data will not be further analyzed in the present
manuscript, but they are available on OSF for secondary analyses
(https://osf.io/5jmze/).

Analytic strategy for lexical decision task
We used generalized estimating equations (GEE) to estimate our
regression parameters instead of ordinary least squares regression (Zeger and Liang, 1986). This allowed us to take learning
effects and other forms of interdependence among participants’
responses into account without assuming homogeneity of variance (see also Gantman and Van Bavel, 2014, 2015b). Because our
stimuli were presented in random order, an exchangeable correlation matrix was specified for all models (Ballinger, 2004). For
analyses using GEE models, we report unstandardized regression
coefficients (B), standard errors (SE) and Wald Z’s (for a similar
analytic strategy, see Freeman et al., 2010; Stern et al., 2013). Moral
words were coded as 1; non-moral words were coded as 0. To
provide further information about effect size, 95% confidence
intervals (CIs) on B values are also reported. When analyzing
the behavioral results, we included all trials, as the EEG artifacts
do not interfere with our behavioral measure. (However, when
analyzing ERP results, trials with artifacts were trimmed from
the data; see ERP Preprocessing.)
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Figure 1B). The voltage differences were amplified with a 16channel V-amp amplifier (Brain Products). Impedance between
electrode and scalp was reduced using both abrasive tape and
Abralyt gel, until each electrode had impedance below 10 kOhms.
Electrode locations were re-referenced offline to the average of
the left and right mastoids. The bipolar vertical and horizontal
electrooculogram (EOG) was recorded with additional electrodes
using two BIP2AUX converters in the V-amp auxiliary channels
(Brain Products). Electrodes were placed 1 cm lateral from the
outer canthus of each eye and above and below the left eye.
These EOG electrodes had their own ground affixed in the central
forehead.
Data were recorded at 1000 Hz with a resolution of 24 bits
(0.049 μV steps) and were filtered online with a 0.1 Hz highpass filter and 200 Hz low-pass filter. Data was collected inside
a sound and radio-frequency attenuated chamber (40A-series;
Electro-Medical Instruments), with copper mesh covering a window. The lights were off during the experiment, and the chamber
window was covered. The only electrical devices inside the
chamber were the amplifier (powered from a battery-powered
laptop located outside the chamber), speakers, keyboard and
mouse (all three powered from outside of the room), the ViewPixx monitor, powered with DC power from outside the chamber, and a battery-powered intercom. There was nothing connected to the internal power outlets. All electrical devices (e.g.
cellphones) were removed from the chamber before recording.

EEG preprocessing
All analyses were completed in Matlab R2012b using the EEGLAB
toolbox (Version 13.3.2b; Delorme and Makeig, 2004), as well as
custom scripts (https://github.com/kylemath/MoralWordEEG).
For ERP analysis, data were filtered offline with a 30 Hz low-pass
FIR filter (eegfilt() in EEGlab). Trials were epoched into 2000 ms
segments locked to the onset the stimulus, including 1000 ms
before the cue as a baseline period. The start of each trial was
centered around 0 μV by subtracting the average voltage in the
200 ms of the baseline immediately prior to the cue, on each
trial and for every electrode. To remove large artifacts due to
movement or other non-cognitive factors, trials with absolute
voltage fluctuations on any channel greater than 1000 μV were
discarded. Eye movements were then removed from the data
using the regression-based eye-movement correction procedure
developed by Gratton et al. (1983). After identifying blinks with a
template-based approach, this technique computes propagation
factors as regression coefficients predicting the vertical and
horizontal eye channel data from the signals at each electrode.
The eye channel data are then subtracted from each channel,
weighted by these propagation factors, thus removing any variance in the EEG predicted by eye movements recorded in the EOG.
Finally, after a second baseline subtraction with the 200 ms precue (since the eye-correction procedure can shift the baseline
as well), trials with remaining absolute voltage fluctuations on
any channel greater than 500 μV were removed from further
analysis. An average of 420.28 (s.d. = 93.01) of the original 500
trials (i.e. 84%) remained for analysis after artifact rejection.

EEG recording

ERP analysis

EEG was recorded from 15 scalp locations (O1, O2, P7, P3, Pz, P4,
P8, T7, C3, Cz, C4, T8, F3, Fz, F4; 10/20 system) and the right
mastoid, referenced online to an electrode affixed to the left
mastoid, with a ground channel at AFz, using 18 Ag/AgCl sintered
ring electrodes (EasyCap) in a 20-channel electrode cap (EasyCap;

The average voltage across all 2000 ms epochs that survived
artifact rejection was computed within each condition, for every
electrode and every participant. We restricted our ERP analyses
to trials where the target was correctly identified as a word
or a non-word, since we cannot be sure what participants saw
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Fig. 2. Predicted means of words correctly identified as words, as estimated from GEE model. Replicating previous research, moral words (79%) were more frequently
identified as words than non-moral words (76%). Error bars represent 95% CIs.

on incorrect trials. ERPs for each individual were computed by
averaging across correct trials within each electrode and each
condition. These ERPs were then plotted as a grand average
across all electrodes and all participants. In addition to the
grand-average ERPs within each condition, we also computed
the within-subjects difference for four contrasts of interest: (1)
moral words–moral non-words; (2) non-moral words–non-moral
non-words; (3) moral words–non-moral words; and (4) moral
non-words–non-moral non-words. (Unsurprisingly, the last contrast revealed that the moral non-words and the non-moral
non-words showed essentially identical ERP activity.)
The contrasts comparing words and non-words within the
moral and non-moral stimulus sets were then averaged, leaving
two contrasts of interest: (1) words–non-words and (2) moral
words–non-moral words, which isolate the ERP activity elicited
by correctly identifying a stimulus as a word and by identifying
a word as moral, respectively. We reasoned that participants
would first need to determine if a stimulus was a word before
they could then determine if the word was moral or not. The
grand-average difference waves for these two contrasts were
plotted.
To minimize researcher degrees of freedom, we selected the
windows for each individual ERP component after looking at the
overall data averaged over all conditions (see Luck and Gaspelin,
2016). We calculated the largest voltages for each component
first, collapsed across all conditions and then selected electrodes
where overall activity was greatest. Then we searched for our
hypothesized differences across conditions. We chose the electrodes with the largest voltage for each of these components
first, collapsed across all conditions and then looked at the
differences between conditions. We then separated the data into
conditions to compare inside each component. Three later components of interest were identified (EPN, 200–350 ms; P3, 350–
600 ms; and LPP, 600–800 ms), and the scalp topographies of the
average voltage across all electrodes within these windows were

plotted. Based on these topographies, we chose single electrodes
to help visualize the effects for each of the three components
of interest, depending on which electrode exhibited the largest
voltage difference from baseline in that component. The EPN
component and the P3 component were both strongest over
electrode Pz. The LPP component was largest over Cz. Lastly,
we plotted the grand-average ERPs, the topographies of the
difference for each of the two contrasts and the within-subject
difference waves for the two contrasts for these electrodes.

Results
Behavioral results: moral pop-out effect
First, we hypothesized that moral words would be more likely
to be seen than matched non-moral words—a phenomenon
known as the moral pop-out effect (Gantman and Van Bavel,
2014, 2016). Following our previous work suggesting that this
effect is greatest under conditions of ambiguity, we decided a
priori to present stimuli that would be perceptually ambiguous
(e.g. due to their font size, color and presentation duration).
Indeed, accuracy overall (including non-words) was close to
the threshold for visual awareness (M = 75%, SE = 0.4%), roughly
halfway between chance responding and perfect accuracy. Replicating our earlier work, moral words (M = 78.5%, SE = 0.5%) were
detected more frequently than non-moral words [M = 75.7%,
SE = 0.5%; B = 0.158, SE = 0.043, 95% CI (0.073, 0.242), P < 0.001,
z = 3.66; see Figure 2; Gantman and Van Bavel, 2014, 2015b] which
were both detected more frequently than non-words, which
were created by scrambling moral words (M = 71.0%, SE = 0.6%) vs
non-words created by scrambling non-moral words (M = 72.8%,
SE = 0.6%).
Overall, participants responded faster to words (M = 553 ms,
SE = 2 ms) vs non-words [M = 611 ms, SE = 2 ms; B = −0.06,
SE = 0.007, 95% CI (−0.07, −0.05), P < 0.001, z = −9.14]; trials with
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no responses have been trimmed from this analysis. Moreover,
within word trials, participants responded marginally faster to
moral words (M = 550, SE = 3 ms) vs non-moral words (M = 556 ms,
SE = 3 ms), though this difference was not statistically significant
[B = −0.005, SE = 0.003, 95% CI (−0.010, 0.001), P = 0.082, z = −1.74].2

EEG results: neural correlates of distinguishing words
from non-words
We first sought to test how early simple distinctions could be
observed between words and non-words. When analyzing the
ERP results, we included all trials surviving artifact rejection
[the moral pop-out effect remains statistically significant
in this subsample of trials, B = 0.16, SE = 0.05, 95% CI (0.06,
0.26), P = 0.002, z = 3.11] and then included only trials where
participants correctly identified the target as a word or a nonword.3 The ERP signature of word discrimination can be observed
in Figure 3A, which plots the averaged stimulus-locked activity
for each of the four conditions at electrode Pz. A large positive
deflection (max ∼3 μV) was observed when participants were
presented with words compared to non-words. The difference
in Pz voltage between words and non-words was evident for
the P2 window [200–250 ms; B = 0.60, SE = 0.10, 95% CI (0.41, 0.80),
P < 0.001, z = 6.02], the N2 window [250–350 ms; B = 1.23, SE = 0.12,
95% CI (0.99, 1.45), P < 0.001, z = 10.38] and the P3 window
[350–600 ms; B = 1.50, SE = 0.13, 95% CI (1.26, 1.75), P < 0.001,
z = 12.00], but not at the LPP time window [600–800 ms; B = −0.14,
SE = 0.12, 95% CI (−0.38, 0.11), P = 0.27, z = −1.10]. As shown in
Figure 3C, words and non-words began to be distinguished
roughly 200 ms after stimulus presentation in the P2 component
time window and continued for roughly 400 ms.
Plotted at Pz, the later difference appeared to take the
form of two components (Figure 3C). The topography of this
difference over the scalp was fronto–central initial and became
more left-posterior over time (Figure 3B). In sum, words and
non-words were distinguished as early as 200 ms after word
onset, potentially at the level of the visual word form area
in the bottom-up ventral visual pathway (McCandliss et al.,
2003).

EEG results: neural correlates of distinguishing moral
from non-moral words
Next, we investigated our central research question: When in
the perceptual processing stream are moral words differentiated from non-moral words? If moral words are differentiated prior to the onset of the word/non-word distinction, this
would provide evidence that the effect is due to differences in
early visual processing. If, however, moral words are prioritized
immediately following the word vs non-word effects, this would

2 We do not consistently find differences in reaction times when stimulus durations are short (∼40 ms); however, when stimulus durations
are longer (and accuracy gets closer to ceiling), we would predict faster
reaction times to moral (vs non-moral words). Indeed, we have found
this pattern in prior work where stimulus durations ranged from 10 to
100 ms.
3 We chose to analyze only the correct trials, because on a trial with
no response, we do not know why participants missed the trial. It is
possible that they were paying attention and simply failed to see the
letter string, but it’s also possible that they were distracted in some way
during the trial. We reasoned that we would still be able to see an early
effect of moral relevance if we could see differences in brain activity
attuned to word recognition unfolding at the same time as differences
in brain activity attuned to moral relevance.

Fig. 3. (Top panel) Grand-average ERPs of the average post-stimulus activity at
electrode Pz for all four conditions separately. (Middle panel) Scalp topographies
of the magnitude of the word—non-word difference, averaged across moral
and non-moral words and non-words. The difference in activity due to the
stimulus being a word or a non-word is largest over fronto–central sites for the
N250 component, largest over left-parietal sites for the P3 component and not
observed for the LPP component. (Bottom panel) Difference wave of the activity
difference between words and non-words (red) and of the difference between
moral and non-moral words (blue) at electrode Pz. The difference between
words and non-words reliably spans the N250 and P3 component time ranges.
Shading represents within-subject standard error (i.e. adjusting for between
subject differences (see Loftus and Mason, 1994).

represent evidence that the content of moral words may be
extracted after basic word processing. A more subtle positive
deflection (max ∼1 μV) was observed when moral words were
presented, compared to non-moral words (Figure 4A). There was
no observable difference in Cz voltage between moral and nonmoral words at P2 [200–250 ms; B = 0.07, SE = 0.10, 95% CI (−0.13,
0.27), P = 0.521, z = 0.64] but a difference emerged shortly thereafter at N2 [250–350 ms; B = 0.30, SE = 0.11, 95% CI (0.08, 0.51),
P = 0.006, z = 2.73] and grew larger at the P3 window [350–600 ms;
B = 0.48, SE = 0.13, 95% CI (0.24, 0.73), P < 0.001, z = 3.85] and the
LPP time window [600–800 ms; B = 0.46, SE = 0.15, 95% CI (0.17,
0.75), P = 0.002, z = 3.11]. Moral words and non-moral words were
distinguishable in the neural data as early as ∼300 ms after word
presentation.
Plotted at Cz, this difference seemed to take the form
of a single, long-lasting positive deflection from ∼300 to
850 ms (Figure 4C). Similar scalp topographies within the P3
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Fig. 4. (Top panel) Grand-average ERPs of the average post-stimulus activity at
electrode Cz for all four conditions separately. (Middle panel) Scalp topographies
of the magnitude of the moral–non-moral difference, for words only. The difference in activity due to the stimulus being a moral or a non-moral word is largest
over left-parietal sites for the P3 component and for the LPP component and not
observed for the N250 component. (Bottom panel) Difference wave of the activity
difference between words and non-words (red) and of the difference between
moral and non-moral words (blue) at electrode Cz. The difference between moral
and non-moral words is significant at the P3 and LPP component time ranges.
Shading represents within-subject standard error (i.e. adjusting for between
subject differences (see Loftus and Mason, 1994)).

component and LPP component windows showing a posterior–
central maxima similar to the canonical P3 topography support
this interpretation (Figure 4B). Thus, moral words begin to
receive different visual processing roughly 100 ms after
words, and non-word processing begins to differ. Further,
the difference appears similar to a classic P3 component
in topography and morphology, indicating that the effect of
morality on word processing may reflect morally relevant
words receiving preferential access to conscious awareness,
via selective attentional enhancement (Dehaene et al., 2006;
Kouider et al., 2013), and that early visual encoding of the
word/non-word distinction may have been unaffected by its
moral content.
Exploratory analyses of arousal and valence. It is critical to distinguish the present effects of moral relevance from potential
effects of valence and arousal, which are fundamental dimensions for categorizing emotionally significant stimuli (Russell

and Barrett, 1999). Indeed, prior evidence suggests that stimuli
that are emotionally arousing preferentially recruit attention
and show variation at LPP (Cuthbert et al., 2000; Lang and Davis,
2006; Olofsson et al., 2008). Similarly, there is a long history of
effects of negativity dominance in psychology (e.g. Rozin and
Royzman, 2001), and our earlier pilot data suggest that moral
words are perceived as more negative than non-moral words
(Gantman and Van Bavel, 2014). Accordingly, it is critical to test
whether word category (moral vs non-moral) explains variation
in P3 activity or if the effects described above simply reflect the
influence of arousal and/or valence.
To test these questions, we utilized human-coded arousal
and valence ratings for moral and non-moral words in our
experiment from a database of 13 915 word ratings (the
‘extended ANEW’ set; Warriner et al., 2013). We were able to
find valence and arousal ratings for 225 of our 250 words (both
moral and non-moral; a list of words without valence and
arousal ratings are available on OSF: https://osf.io/5jmze/). We
then conducted the same analyses detailed above, but replacing
arousal ratings with moral vs non-moral word coding. We tested
the effect of arousal at all four time points specified above (P2,
N2, P3 and LPP). There was no observable effect of arousal at
any time point except at the P3 window [350–600 ms; B = 0.38,
SE = 0.12, 95% CI (0.10, 0.58), P = 0.006, z = 2.76], such that more
arousing words were associated with greater P3 amplitudes.
However when word category (moral vs non-moral coding) and
arousal (continuous ratings) were modeled simultaneously, they
both separately affect voltage at the P3 window, with moral (vs
non-moral) words [B = 0.43, SE = 0.14, 95% CI (0.15, 0.70), P = 0.002,
z = 3.04] showing a qualitatively larger effect than highly
arousing words [B = 0.27, SE = 0.12, 95% CI (0.04, 0.51), P = 0.02,
z = 2.27].
We conducted the same analysis with valence ratings and
found observable effects of valence at both the P3 window
[350–600 ms; B = −0.20, SE = 0.06, 95% CI (−0.07, −0.33), P = 0.002,
z = 3.09] and LPP window [600–800 ms; B = −0.18, SE = 0.09, 95%
CI (−0.01, −0.35), P = 0.04, z = 2.11] such that more negative
words were associated with greater amplitudes during both
windows. However when word category (moral vs non-moral)
and valence (continuous ratings) were modeled simultaneously,
they both separately affected voltage at the P3 window, with
moral words [B = 0.40, SE = 0.15, 95% CI (0.11, 0.70), P = 0.006,
z = 2.74] showing a qualitatively larger effect than more negative
words [B = −0.15, SE = 0.07, 95% CI (−0.28, −0.02), P = 0.03,
z = 2.23]. During the later LPP window, when we model both
valence and morality, we find that only the effect of word
category (moral vs non-moral) remains [B = 0.43, SE = 0.16,
95% CI (0.12, 0.74), P = 0.007, z = 2.71]. These results suggest
that our theoretically driven categorization of moral vs nonmoral words is able to explain unique variance in brain
activity that is separate from variance explained by arousal or
valence.
Exploratory repetition analysis. It has been suggested that the
moral pop-out effect can be explained by differences in memory rather than differences in perception (Firestone and Scholl,
2015a). The authors of this critique proposed that evidence of
repetition priming would be suggestive that memory is playing
a key role in the frequent correct categorization of moral (vs
non-moral) words. From this perspective, there would be an
advantage for a given moral word if it had been preceded by
a moral word but not by a non-moral one. It is worth noting
then that whether a trial was a repeated trial (e.g. a moral word
preceded by a moral word or a non-moral word preceded by a
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non-moral word) it has no effect on differences in ERP activity
(P = 0.69). This suggests that changes in the P3 window reported
here are not reliably tracking potential effects of repetition.
Moreover, further exploratory analyses revealed no effect of
repetition for moral words only or for non-moral words only (all
Ps > 0.05). It is unlikely that differences in P3 activity reported
here can be explained by differences in repetition and, thereby,
do not strongly suggest that differences in memory are solely
responsible for the moral pop-out effect. It is worth noting that
this is not to say that repetition does not or cannot affect overall
accuracy in our lexical decision task. We present these analyses
simply to show that repetition does not explain away the effect
that moral relevance has on whether a word reaches conscious
awareness.

Discussion
This paper examined when morality is prioritized in perceptual
awareness. We used a combination of behavioral and neuroscientific methods to determine when in the perceptual processing
stream moral words become more likely to be seen than nonmoral words. First, we successfully replicated the moral popout effect, such that participants were more likely to correctly
identify moral words compared to matched non-moral words
(Gantman and Van Bavel, 2014, 2016). Second, we found that
moral words were differentiated from non-moral words as early
as 300 ms after presentation—which was roughly 100 ms after
people had encoded the difference between words and nonwords. Finally, we found that differences in brain activity for
moral vs non-moral words cannot be explained by differences
in the valence of or arousal related to the words. These results
most strongly align with Hypothesis 2 stated in the Introduction:
morality affects what reaches perceptual awareness. Specifically, moral words were prioritized over non-moral words later
in perceptual processing, reflecting a post-perceptual cognitive
process (Squires et al., 1977; Polich, 2012), which prioritizes moral
(vs non-moral) content to reach conscious awareness (Dehaene
et al., 2006; Kouider et al., 2013, though for a dispute regarding this
interpretation of P3 activity, see Cohen et al., 2020, January 16).

Time course of moral word identification
Overall, the neural data we observed suggest two independent effects of our stimuli on subsequent ERP amplitudes.
Participants begin to differentiate words from non-words as
early as 200 ms after stimulus presentation and primarily over
frontal recording sites. Very soon after participants encoded
these words, the difference in activity between words and nonwords transitioned to left-posterior recording sites, where moral
and non-moral words began to be discriminated by 300 ms
post-presentation. Thus, the shift in information processing
was observed in time as well as space—with activity moving
from frontal to posterior cortex as moral words were encoded
and prioritized in perceptual processing. Of course, the spatial
resolution of EEG is relatively coarse and limited. With that
in mind, we encourage future work using functional magnetic
resonance imaging to achieve a more precise understanding of
the neural correlates of the moral pop-out effect in particular
and moral perception in general.
It is important to note that moral content remained privileged in information processing as higher-order cognition came
online. By 600 ms, the ERP activity could no longer discriminate
whether a word or a non-word had been presented. However,
there was a consistent difference in ERP activity between moral
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and non-moral words until approximately 850 ms after the stimuli were presented, suggesting a sustained preference for moral
content. We tentatively interpret this finding as a threshold
effect: the emergence of differential P3 activity for moral vs
non-moral words suggests that moral words may receive and
maintain a preferential gateway into conscious awareness. As
such, it appears that the moral pop-out effect is likely not a
perceptual pop-out, but perhaps a pop-in, to awareness.
Moreover, we note that our exploratory analyses rule out
the possibility that the increase in P3 (as well as LPP) magnitude for moral vs non-moral words can be attributed to factors
confounded with morality. While previous work demonstrates
the sensitivity of these waveforms to arousing stimuli (e.g. Olofsson et al., 2008), these results suggest that the moral content of
words presented in our task captured awareness over and above
both arousal and valence. Finally, despite the relatively mixed
ERP literature on moral cognition, we note that these results
dovetail with previous findings, indicating that morality exerts
its influence on processing about 300 ms after the presentation
of lexical information (Yang et al., 2014, 2017). We note that
other research on the time course of moral responses using
photographic images as stimuli has observed morality-specific
effects in earlier time windows (e.g. N1, Yoder and Decety, 2014;
Gui et al., 2016; see also Decety and Cacioppo, 2012), while work
examining the temporal dynamics of moral judgments using
vignettes observes effects of morality in later time windows (e.g.
LPP, Leuthold et al., 2015). Future work should directly assess
how differences in stimulus format influence the time course
of moral perception.
Ultimately, we chose to focus on the presentation of morally
relevant words for a few key reasons. First, moral words are
more likely to be seen than non-moral words—a phenomenon
termed the moral pop-out effect. Critically, the moral pop-out
effect only occurs when letter strings are presented ambiguously—near the threshold for visual awareness (Gantman and
Van Bavel, 2014). We recognize that the differences in accuracy
for moral (79%) vs non-moral words (76%) are not particularly
large. However, there is a reason to think it is both theoretically
and practically important. Although CIs are the best measure
of effect size for GEE analyses, we can utilize the z-score to
get a rough estimate, r2 = 0.27, a moderate effect in Psychology
(Ferguson, 2009). Theoretically, this experiment expands on this
prior work by clarifying the underlying neural processes that
precede moral word identification. Practically, people consume
and share enormous volumes of moral language—especially on
social media (e.g. Twitter). By one estimate, people scroll through
300 feet of social media content per day. An effect of this size
could accumulate over such a large volume of content. People
are now more likely to experience moral outrage from learning
about an event online than in real life (Crockett, 2017) and are
more likely to share messages (e.g. retweet a Tweet) that contain
moral–emotional (vs neutral) content in political conservations
(Brady et al., 2017). The perceptual salience of moral words can
help us understand why. Tweets that contain moral language are
more likely to be seen, and the degree to which they capture our
attention is related to real online sharing behavior (by a completely separate group of users) on Twitter (Brady, Gantman and
Van Bavel, 2019). As such, understanding how and when moral
word processing affects perception is timely and consequential.
That said, future work should examine whether these processes
apply to other, more ecologically valid, moral stimuli in addition
to moral words presented alone, as we did here.
Another important caveat to this work is our sample.
To study moral perception using words, we were limited to
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English-speaking students. Unfortunately, we do not yet know
if the results generalize other populations. We welcome and
encourage future work on the moral pop-out effect with a variety
of samples and further suggest that words that are deemed
morally relevant by participants may vary with different samples
and should be tailored to different populations. This approach
would not only examine the generality of our findings, but might
identify critical boundary conditions that elucidate new aspects
of human morality and vision. Given that morality is culturally
constructed, we think this is an important and fruitful avenue
for future research.

Conclusion
The present research utilized electroencephalography to examine the time course of moral perception. Previous research has
suggested that moral words are more likely to be seen than nonmoral words and speculated that this effect occurs at the level of
visual experience rather than memory or response preparation.
To disentangle these possibilities, we utilized a temporally sensitive measurement of brain activity in order to observe when
in the perceptual processing stream moral words bias brain
activity. We observed that moral stimuli were distinguished from
non-moral stimuli within a few hundred milliseconds (∼300 ms
after stimulus onset)—immediately after people had encoded
whether the letter string was a word or not. This work replicates
and clarifies previous research on moral perception, while also
extending our understanding of the social factors that may
heighten conscious awareness. This work suggests that moral
content is more likely to be seen because it lowers the threshold
for being broadcasted to conscious awareness.
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